Given the pervasive influence of Realpolitik over government and the study of international relations, and some inherent difficulties within the field of psychoanalysis, it is not surprising that political science and psychoanalysis remain distant cousins. Part III in this series on diplomacy and psychoanalysis discusses obstacles against collaboration between these two disciplines, but also points to areas where collaboration is possible and can be useful.
introduced the concept in Grundsatze der Realpolitik (1853) . Rochau advised politicians to estimate carefully what the opposition really wanted, not what they said they wanted, and to be prepared to exert force when necessary to support one's own or thwart another's objectives. Eventually the term came to mean the rational evaluation and realistic assessment of the options available to one's group and one's enemies. In the United States, especially after World War II, this latter interpretation of Realpolitik, named the "Rational Actor Model," became prevalent in political analysis. This model (in its various forms) assumes that people make decisions by engaging in a rational calculation of costs and benefits, and that leaders, governments and nations are rational "actors." (For various studies of this model, its modifications and criticism see: Etzioni, 1967; George, 1969; Allison, 1971; Janis and Mann, 1977; White, 1980; Barner-Barry and Rosenwein, 1985; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; Achen and Snidal, 1989, Volkan et al., 1998) .
The so-called "deterrence" theories characteristic of the Cold War era depended on this type of rational approach, and many political analysts believe that decisions made according to rational actor models prevented the Soviets and the Americans from using their nuclear arsenals. This is most likely the case, but policies based on deterrence have also failed, and research in a variety of disciplines has demonstrated that decisions were not always predictable based on rational assumptions. For instance, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat surprised both Israeli and U.S. military intelligence by launching a massive attack across the Suez Canal on Yom Kippur (October 6), 1973. Based on the rational calculations of deterrence, policy analysts did not believe an Egyptian offensive could be launched before 1975, and reports of Egyptian troop movements in September 1973 were regarded as only exercises. Egyptian forces therefore were able to overrun poorly manned Israeli defenses and drive deep into the Sinai, although Sadat's army ultimately suffered heavy losses before a cease-fire. As the shortcomings of various rational actor models became evident, some political scientists, and even some government decision makers and diplomats, began to borrow concepts from cognitive psychology in the late 1970s and early 1980s to explain "faulty" decision making. But they did not look to psychoanalysis for insights.
The application of cognitive psychology nevertheless expanded the scope of political analysis. But the limitations of this approach, which focused primarily on conscious considerations, also became evident. This shortcoming was recognized by Janis and Mann (1977) , who discussed the relevance of unconscious motivations in their application of cognitive concepts to decision-making. They suggested a link between disciplines when they noted that, "If the study of unconscious motives that affect
